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Introduction
Referring to politics in the totok Chinese community1 in Indonesia in the 
1950s, Professor Skinner has stated:
During the decade from 1948 to 1958, the struggle between Communist 
and Kuomintang partisans permeated all levels of Totok society, and 
in consequence foreign Chinese in Indonesia are highly politicized.
There is evidence to suggest that by 1957 a neutral or moderate posi­
tion was fast becoming untenable. 2
Such a statement is typical of the way Western scholars have tended to depict the 
political struggle within the totok community at this time as primarily between 
"Communist" and "Kuomintang" partisans. This article is designed to show that 
rather than being dominated by the ideological struggle between Taiwan and the 
mainland, during the early 1950s the behavior of the totok Chinese business class 
in particular was primarily determined by their insecure domestic position as a 
pariah-entrepreneurial group in a potentially hostile, even dangerous environment.
Physically different from the Indonesian majority, occupying an important and 
visible economic position, and long regarded with considerable suspicion, the Chi­
nese community of Indonesia, both totok and peranakan must have viewed the com­
ing of Indonesian independence from the Dutch with anxiety. The fears of the 
overseas Chinese with regard to their future within Indonesia were complicated by 
the fact that at almost the same time as The Netherlands transferred sovereignty 
over the archipelago to the Republican government of Indonesia, the Chinese Com­
munist Party completed its rise to power in China.
1. The distinction between the totok and peranakan communities in Indonesia has 
recently been described as follows: "Since about the beginning of this century, it 
has been possible to distinguish two groups o f Chinese in Indonesia, on the one 
hand the totoks (literally, 'of pure blood') being those who had recently immi­
grated, spoke Chinese and were culturally oriented towards China, and on the 
other the much older peranakan communities being characterised by the use of the 
vernacular language for everyday purposes and by a distinctive set of cultural 
traits which were neither wholly Chinese nor wholly Indonesian." J. A. C. Mackie 
and Charles A. Coppel, "A Preliminary Survey," in The Chinese in Indonesia, Five 
Essays, ed. J. A. C. Mackie (Melbourne: Nelson, 1976), p. 5.
2. See G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. 
McVey (New Haven: HRAF, 1963), pp. 115-16. An earlier survey of totok pol­
itics by the same author can be found in his Report on the Chinese in Southeast 




The period of totok politics under review, then, took place at a time when sub­
stantial changes were occurring in Indonesia's domestic and international situation 
which profoundly affected the position of the Chinese in Indonesia. In 1950, the 
Hatta government granted recognition to the Chinese People's Republic (CPR). 
Shortly before, by the agreements reached between the Dutch and the Indonesians 
at the Round Table Conference in The Hague, Indonesian local-born Chinese were 
given a period of two years to opt either to remain as Indonesian citizens or reject 
that status. This faced a Chinese with the following choices: to become an Indo­
nesian citizen; to become a citizen of the CPR; or to be stateless; for with the 
Hatta government's recognition of the new government in Peking as the legitimate 
government of China, only citizens of the CPR, not those of the Republic of China 
(RC) on Taiwan, would be considered "legal Chinese citizens" in Indonesia. For 
a business group the disadvantages of being stateless were high, and such con­
siderations as the need for protection, to conduct trade outside the country, and 
to have a passport to carry out business trips abroad would make it likely that 
many of them would incline towards opting for Chinese citizenship.
Economic Position and Political Orientation
In discussing the political orientation of totok businessmen, it is essential first 
to consider what kinds of totok Chinese are covered by the term "businessmen," 
and how significant was the proportion of such businessmen in the total totok pop­
ulation in Indonesia. Totok Chinese society in Indonesia was largely formed dur­
ing the last decades of the nineteenth cent,ury and the first decades of the twen­
tieth. By the mid-1950s, the total population of Indonesian Chinese numbered 
about 2.2 million,3 4of which perhaps 1.4 million were totok. “*
There was no statistical survey of the proportion of totok Chinese involved in 
business during the period under review. But we may draw inferences from the 
rather careful 1930 census, which included a general survey of the occupational 
structure of the total Chinese community (both peranakan and totok). This por­
tion of the census indicated that the major occupation of the Chinese was commerce, 
which accounted for over a third (36.6 percent) of working Chinese. About a 
fifth were engaged in industry, mainly as small craftsmen. The remaining working 
Chinese were engaged in garden agriculture, or coolie labor on plantations and in 
mines. 5 There is little doubt that between 1930 and 1950 the economic status of
3. See Skinner, "Chinese Minority," p. 100.
4. The percentage of totok Chinese is calculated by projection from the census of 
1930. After the 1930s mass immigration from China was officially prohibited. See 
Leo Suryadinata, "Indigenous Indonesians, The Chinese Minority and China: A 
Study of Perception and Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 
Washington, D .C ., 1975), pp. 119-20.
5. The above information is cited from J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A 
Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 412. 
According to the same census, more than half o f the Chinese in Java were involved 
in trade, while Chinese outside Java were more likely to be peasants, farmers, 
plantation workers, or fishermen. But it should be noted that a trader might be 
anything from a peddler to a magnate and the number of the former was very much 
greater than the latter. Chinese involved in industry included unskilled laborers 
and skilled artisans, as well as factory owners. Mackie and Coppel, "A Preliminary 
Survey," pp. 7-8. For a more thorough treatment of the Chinese economic role 
during the colonial period, see W. J. Cator, The Economic Position of the Chinese 
in the Netherlands Indies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).
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many Chinese improved. In the early '50s, a considerable proportion of the Chi­
nese, mainly those living in Java, were retail traders and rural middlemen who 
purchased smallholders’ agricultural commodities throughout Indonesia. They may 
be considered as petty capitalists. In addition, there were a certain number of 
Chinese capitalists who played an important part in wholesale trade, such as 
import-export, industry, finance, and transport services, although their economic 
power was not yet comparable to that of the still dominant Western entrepreneurs 
in Indonesia. 6
However, as our concern is with totok Chinese rather than Indonesia's Chinese 
community as a whole, the economic position of many totok in the early 1950s has 
to be distinguished from that of the peranakan Chinese. The overwhelming major­
ity of the totok Chinese who migrated to the Indies at the turn of the century be­
gan work as laborers, but within about half a century a number of them had im­
proved their economic position considerably. In the business field, many left 
their peranakan counterparts far behind. This is evident from the totok business­
men's activity in the siang-hui, or business associations. Before 1910, in certain 
business associations, although "the new migrants [totok] had not yet risen to own­
ing and managing their own business, they had become the more active members of 
the associations."7 In other siang-hui, such as the Siang-hui Batavia, as early 
as the close of the first decade, totok members apparently outnumbered perana­
kan. 8 These were indeed signposts pointing to the fact that certain totok busi­
nessmen at this stage were beginning to make their way in the field of business 
and to outstrip their peranakan counterparts. The shift of economic power from 
peranakan to totok businessmen continued during the next twenty years, until, 
by the mid-1930s, the widening gap between the two groups had become obvious.
In 1934, the great majority of the participants in the founding meeting of the 
Siang-hui Federation were totok businessmen and the language used in the meet­
ing was Chinese instead of Indonesian. Even peranakan newspapers commented 
that "the peranakan Chinese were left behind by their totok counterparts in com­
mercial activities." 9 After the Second World War, many more peranakan fell to the 
rank of laborer or turned to other professions, and the business vacuum was part­
ly filled by totok businessmen.10
In the early '50s, "business" was the most frequently listed occupation of 
totok Chinese, especially in the urban areas of Java.11 In Jakarta, it was men­
6. For Chinese economic roles in commerce and industry, see Ralph Anspach, 
"Indonesia," in Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia, ed. 
F. H. Golay, R. Anspach, M. R. Pfanner, and E. B. Ayal (Ithaca: Cornell Univer­
sity Press, 1969), particularly pp. 114-16, 182-84; see also J. A. C. Maekie, "The 
Indonesian Economy, 1950-1963," in The Economy of Indonesia, Selected Readings, 
ed. Bruce Glassburner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 30, 44-45, 
64-68.
7. Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese 
Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916 (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960), p. 102.
8. Suryadinata, "Peranakan Chinese Politics," pp. 11-12.
9. Ib id ., p. 99.
10. Li Ch'uan-shou, "Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya hua-ch'iaochiao-yu shi" [The History of 
Chinese Education in Indonesia], Nan-yang Hsueh-pao, 15, 2 (1959), p. 19.
11. See, for example, Chiao Ying, "I-tien i-chien ho hsi-wang" [Some Opinions 
and Hopes], Sheng Huo Pao (Jakarta), 1951 New Year Special Number. See also 
Wu Shih-huang, Yeh-ch'eng ta-kuan [A Description of Jakarta] (Jakarta: n .p .,
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tioned that "generally these businessmen are either erh-p'an-shang (middlemen) 
or san-pan-shang (waning [small shop] ow ners)."12 The dominant role played by 
warung owners in Jakarta is indicated by the size of the Warung Association, which 
had more than 3,000 members. This organization came to be one of the most politi­
cally influential among all pro-KMT totok organizations.13 There were also other, 
still smaller businesses run by Chinese, for example the "stall businesses," which 
appeared in great numbers after the end of the war.14 By the term "businessman," 
then, I am referring primarily to entrepreneurs down to the level of petty capital­
ists.
(This focus on the Chinese businessmen in Indonesia, however, does not im­
ply that there were no totok Chinese workers and peasants, particularly in the 
outer islands. During the early 1950s various lower-class Chinese occupational 
organizations, for example the Federation of the Peasantry (Nung-min Lien-ho- 
hui) , the General Federation of Workers (Chih-kung Chung-hui) , and the Agricul­
tural and Mechanic Association (Yen-i-chi-ch'i Kung-hui), were operating in dif­
ferent parts of the archipelago.15)
After Indonesia recognized China in April 1950, totok businessmen were less 
active in expressing their political attitudes than, for example, the Chinese stu­
dents. 16 Views in the business community varied, not only by dialect group,17
1951), p. 2; and Chen Chih-fei, "I-nien lai pa-tung hua-ch'iao k'ai-k'uan" [An 
Outline of the Padang Chinese in the Past Year], T'ien Sheng Jih Pao (Jakarta), 
January 1, 1952.
12. Wu Shih-huang, Yeh-ch'eng ta-kuan.
13. Chung-Hsing, Yeh-chia-ta hua shang ya-lung kung-hui hung-i-shun kung- 
hui fan-kung t'ou cheng chi shih [The Anticommunist Records of the Jakarta 
Warung Bond and of the Hung-i-shun Association] (Jakarta: n .p ., 1952), pt. 1, 
pp. 7-47.
14. The stall runners formed their own occupational organization. In 1953, more 
than 800 Chinese stall runners were registered as members of the Stall Runners' 
Association (T'an-sang Kung-hui) in Jakarta. The majority of the stall runners 
were said to have been shop watchers and workers. For a brief history of the 
development of the stall business, see "Yeh-chia-ta t'an-sang kung-hui ch'i- 
chou-nien chi-nien te k'an" [The Special Number of the Seventh Anniversary of 
the Jakarta Stall Runners' Association], Sheng Huo Pao, November 12, 1953; see 
also Hsin Pao, July 26, 1949.
15. For such organizations in Palembang, see Hsiien Chi, "Chu-kang te ai-kuo 
ch'iao-tuan" [Patriotic Organizations in Palembang], Sheng Huo Pao, 1953 New 
Year Special Number; for Pontianak, see Feng, "I-nien lai te k'un-tien" [Pontianak 
in the Past Year], Sheng Huo Pao, 1953 New Year Special Number; for Belitung, 
see Sheng Huo Pao, February 22, 1952. In Bagan Siapiapi, the overwhelming 
majority of about 30,000 Chinese resident there were fishermen: see "Yin-ni te 
chung-kuo shih-chen" [A Chinese Town in Indonesia: Bagan Siapiapi], Sheng 
Huo Pao, April 24, 1951.
16. On Chinese student activity, see Twang Peck-yang, "The Internal Dynamics 
of Totok Chinese Politics in Indonesia, 1950-1954" (M.A. thesis, Monash Univer­
sity, 1979), ch. 2.
17. The totok community as a whole was divided into a number of dialect groups, 
each of which tended to coincide—though the coincidence was not exact—with a 
certain economic position and a certain political orientation. Skinner has stated:
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but also from place to place18 and from individual to individual, and the outwardly 
expressed political attitudes of businessmen often changed with the changes in the 
Indonesian political climate.19 But although during the years under review their 
political orientation fluctuated, it can be suggested with some confidence that totok 
businessmen as a whole appeared to be China-oriented.
Professor Skinner has attempted to seek the reasons for this political orienta­
tion in the earlier history of the merchants' relations with China and with Sun Yat- 
sen's revolution:
. . . the relatively wealthy and well-established Hokkiens eschewed 
[Sun Yat-sen's] revolution and were thereby diverted from commitment 
to the KMT. In consequence they found themselves more flexible in 
the postwar world, better able to make a realistic adjustment to politi­
cal changes. Moreover, as the dominant overseas merchants among the 
Indonesian Chinese, Hokkiens were inclined to back the political force 
destined to control the mainland Chinese ports with which they custom­
arily traded. 20
It is clear, however, that such an explanation takes into account only external 
factors and not the concrete situation of the totok Chinese in the context of Indo­
nesian society.
It is certainly true that in the early 1950s the sentiments of totok Chinese (in­
cluding businessmen) were primarily oriented toward China, or, more accurately, 
toward their place of birth. 21 Without disputing the strength of such sentiments,
I would nevertheless argue that they are less important in understanding the totok 
businessman's attitudes than are his political and economic position within Indone­
" Speech- group membership is one of the most important correlates of political 
alignment among the Indonesian Chinese: Hakkas tend to be rightist, Cantonese 
intermediate, while Hokkiens are decidedly leftist." See Skinner, "Chinese Minor­
ity ," p. 116. Other scholars share this view. See, for example, David Mozingo, 
Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1976), p . 96.
18. KMT and pro-KMT totoks in certain areas, such as Aceh, seem to have domi­
nated the totok political scene throughout these years. It was claimed that in Aceh 
pro-China organizations were in no way able to compete with the pro-KMT "righ­
teous" organizations. This was also the case in Jambi. Other pro-KMT sources 
also claimed that in places like Bangka, Medan, and Pontianak, pro-KMT totok 
organizations were powerful in early 1952. See Tai Ch'ang, "I-nien lai yin-hua- 
she-hui tung-t'ai" [The Situation of the Indonesian Chinese Society in the Past 
Y ear], T'ien Sheng Jih Pao, January 1, 1952; see also Tso Chou, "Stin-shui i- 
nien lai te ch'iao k'uang" [The Situation of the Surabaya Chinese in the Past 
Year], T'ien Sheng Jih Pao, January 11, 1952.
19. For the way the Indonesian internal political situation affected the totok polit­
ical conflict, see Twang, "Internal Dynamics," ch. 6.
20. Skinner, "Chinese Minority," p. 494 n. 35.
21. This phenomenon is not unique to the Chinese but is also common among mi­
grants o f other races,such as Europeans who migrated to other parts of the world. 
See T'ien Ju-k'ang, The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure, Mono­
graph on Social Anthropology, No. 12 (London: London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 1953), ch. 10. For expressions of totok Chinese sentiments to­
wards their birthplaces, see, for example, Hsin Pao, November 17, 1950.
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sia, the history of his relationship with Indonesian society, and his feelings of 
insecurity within it.
History of Insecurity
Until the early decades of this century, although a white-collar, noncapitalist 
middle class existed in Indonesian society,22 there was no genuine Indonesian mid­
dle class in a commercial sense. If one were to distinguish any such class there, 
distinct from Western entrepreneurs, it would have been composed mainly of some 
members of one ethnic minority—the Chinese. The first cry of the organized Indo­
nesian nationalist movement was directed against this group, in particular against 
Chinese batik and kretek entrepreneurs. The Surakarta Sarekat Dagang Islam 
(Islamic Trading Society), formed in 1911, was initially a commercial organization, 
but it soon shifted its orientation to politics in an attempt to stop Chinese business­
men from penetrating "the last preserve of the Javanese merchant and industrial 
c lass."23 24 This attempt by asli (indigenous) entrepreneurs met with little success, 
and Chinese continued to dominate the batik and kretek fields. But the move did 
give notice that Chinese entrepreneurs would be likely in the future to face a con­
tinuing organized challenge from their asli counterparts, and indeed the Sarekat 
Dagang Islam was later transformed into the Sarekat Islam, one of the major Indo­
nesian nationalist organizations.
Despite latent Indonesian resentment of the economic position occupied by the 
Chinese in Indies society, relations between the two communities only occasionally 
erupted into violence before the Second World War, as in the anti-Chinese riots of 
1918 and 1931 in Kudus and Pekalongan. 21* During the early months of the Japa­
nese occupation, however, Indonesian antagonism against the local Chinese led to 
widespread acts of vandalism and violence, with the result that "Peranakans and 
totoks in Java soon felt that they had more to fear from the Indonesians than from 
the Japanese . . . [and so] many chose to cooperate with the occupying power and 
entrusted their security to Nippon."25 (Here it should be noted that the choice by 
Indonesian Chinese to cooperate with the Japanese at a time when China was still 
at war with Japan already undermines arguments by Western scholars that totok 
politics were primarily an extension of the politics of China.) Their most serious 
ordeal was during the Revolution, when Indonesian mobs and irregular forces fre­
quently attacked Chinese and their property, particularly during the early months 
and in areas being evacuated by the Republic. 26 Feeling that the Indonesian
22. W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change, 
2nd ed. rev. (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1959), pp. 94, 232; see also George Kahin, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952),
p. 28.
23. Ibid.
24. Donald E. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia 1900-1958, 
Modern Indonesia Project Monograph (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1961), p . 12.
25. Mary Somers Heidhues, "Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Cornell University, 1965), pp. 111-12.
26. See ib id ., pp. 112-19. See also Chung-hua Tsung-hui [Federation of Chinese 
Associations] (Jakarta), Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and Inhumanity 
Perpetrated by Indonesian Bands against Innocent Chinese before and after July 
21st, 1947 (Jakarta: n .p ., 1947). Until the latter part of 1949, many Chinese had 
fled the cities. In July 1949, it was reported that 5,000 totok were missing in
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government was affording them insufficient protection against this violence, vari­
ous Chinese communities established their own security force, the Pao An Tui 
(Peace Preservation Corps), a body which, though defensive in purpose, was 
viewed by Indonesians as hostile to the Republic,27 because it was given arms by 
the Dutch. Its formation, then, intensified Indonesian resentment against the 
Chinese supporting it.
The Japanese occupation had served to some extent to enhance the position of 
certain asli entrepreneurs vis-a-vis the Chinese business community. According 
to Sutter, a policy of limited Indonesianization of portions of the economy was pub­
licly aired for the first time in 1944, 28 and by mid-1945, there were many signs of 
increased asli business activity. New business organizations such as the Susunan 
Ekonomi Bangsa Indonesia Islam (Islamic Indonesian Economic Organization), Ga- 
bungan Perusahaan Barang2 dari Karet (Association of Rubber Products Compa­
nies) , and Gabungan Pertukangan Kulit dan Karet Bangsa Indonesia Cirebon 
(Association of Indonesian Hide and Rubber Merchants of Cirebon) were set up.
In July 1945, a conference called Permusyawaratan Kaum Ekonomi Indonesia Selu- 
ruh Jawa (All Java Conference of Indonesian Businessmen) was held in Bandung 
and many distinguished guests attended, including Hatta and Sukarno. Not sur­
prisingly, the first o f the five resolutions passed in this conference was ’’that a 
Persatuan Tenaga Ekonomi Bangsa Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Businessmen) 
be established. " 29
Of the three years following the Indonesian declaration of independence, how­
ever, only 1946 saw a relative increase in asli business activity. In 1947 and 
1948, as a result of the struggle against the Dutch, losses of territory and eco­
nomic resources, and a tightening Dutch blockade, only a few new businesses 
were established. Perhaps in consequence asli businessmen began to receive more 
attention and assistance from the government, with the BRI (Bank Republik Indo­
nesia), for example, deciding in late 1946 that it would give greater attention to 
asli businessmen. Meanwhile the term "middle class" seemed to appear more fre­
quently in the Indonesian press, and a "middle class" bank (the reoriented BRI) 
was set up. Also, business conferences were held by organizations such as the 
Sarekat Dagang Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Trading Society)—an organi­
zation reminiscent of the one formed more than three decades earlier. In conclud­
ing his discussion of the four years of the development of indigenous Indonesian 
business, Sutter allowed that "it is a fact that most of the few old Indonesian com­
panies did expand operations during this period, and a number of new ones did 
arise, many of which would prove to be viable." 30
However, it was not until the Round Table Conference of August 1949 that the 
Republican government formally declared that its economic policy was to favor the 
"economically weak groups." An important segment of the Republican delegation
East Java and an unknown number of the Chinese were held in different parts of 
Indonesia by the Indonesian military.
27. See Charles A. Coppel, "Patterns o f Chinese Political Activity in Indonesia," 
in Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays, p. 41.
28. John O. Sutter, Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955,
4 vols., Southeast Asia Program Data Paper (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1959), 1, 
p. 270.
29. Ibid., p. 262.
30. Ib id ., 2, p. 637.
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to the conference was the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee, headed by 
then Minister of State Ir. Djuanda. The major task of his committee was to draft 
an agreement concerning the business privileges to be given to ethnic groups in 
Indonesia. Article 11 of the Financial and Economic Agreement, signed on Novem­
ber 2, 1949, stipulated that the Federal Republic of Indonesia (RIS) had the right 
to make "such regulations as are necessary for safeguarding national interests and 
protecting economically weak groups."31 Under the terms of this agreement Djuan­
da later proclaimed, among other things, that Indonesian importers would receive 
government protection so that they would be able to compete with foreign importers.
One of the crucial steps taken in favor of indigenous Indonesian importers was 
the adoption in April 1950 of the Benteng (fortress) system.32 This was specifi­
cally intended to favor the "national importers," who included merely the "bangsa 
Indonesia asli." Under the Benteng system, in a move against the Dutch as well 
as the Chinese wholesaler, easily salable consumer goods were reserved by decree 
for national importers, and various government-owned banks and credit agencies 
were established. The scheme, however, "was beset by troubles from the start 
and resulted in the creation of only a handful of Indonesian bona fide importers," 33 34
and the Indonesian government finally dropped the word "asli" in 1953.
Although until 1955 the degree of emphasis on "national enterprise" fluctuated 
from government to government, general policy did not change. By August 1953,
40 percent of all imports were technically in the reserved sector,3I> and, in August 
1954, the Minister of Economic Affairs announced that 85 percent of all import li­
censes would be allocated to national importers. 35 In other fields, such as trans­
port and manufacture, alien Chinese confronted similar restrictions. But perhaps 
most significant of all was the fact that by May 1954, it was already being rumored 
that alien Chinese would not be permitted to run warung and other small enter­
prises in Indonesia. Keng Po published an article on May 4, pointing out that both 
the Minister of Economic Affairs (Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo) and the Minister of Fi­
nance (Dr. Ong Eng Die) had said that, in order to transform the colonial economic 
structure into a national one, the government would have to revise the 1934 busi­
ness decree. The article further stated that the new business decree would pro­
hibit alien Chinese from being hawkers, warung owners, and small entrepreneurs. 
Reportedly, the decree had already been drafted, and was awaiting Cabinet ap­
proval. 36 Although the Minister of Finance denied Keng Po's statement a week 
after it appeared, the Union of Indonesian Businessmen welcomed the rumored de­
cree.
31. Ibid., 3, p. 1017.
32. For an account of the Benteng system, see A. M. de Neuman, "On the Promo­
tion of Indigenous Indonesian Industries with Special Reference to Credit Facilities 
for Private Business and for Local Government Enterprises," Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia, 9, 11 (November 1956), pp. 698-99. See also Anspach, "Indonesia," pp. 
168-78, and Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 3, pp. 1017-29.
33. Mackie and Coppel, "Preliminary Survey," p. 13.
34. Anspach, "Indonesia," p. 172.
35. Ib id ., p. 173.
36. "Kuan-yii chin-chih wai-ch'iao ching-ying ya-lung ho hsiao-ch'i-yeh te chuan- 
shuo" [The Rumor about Forbidding Alien Chinese Running Warung and Small En­
terprises], Sheng Huo Pao, Editorial, May 18, 1954.
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Faced with the post-1950 government policy of "Indonesianization" of the new 
nation's economy, totok Chinese society was well aware of its altered situation.
To politically conscious totoks sympathetic to Indonesian independence, the changes 
were natural enough. To them, it was the Chinese businessman's responsibility to 
adjust himself to his new environment. As early as 1949 Hsin Pao had warned hua- 
kiao (totok) that "those who want to continue living on this piece of land should 
have a new determination and a new understanding of the situation, or it may not 
be easy for them to retain a foothold any longer . . . tung-ch'iao [fellow country­
men] should make a radical change in their attitudes. Whatever business we run, 
besides gaining reasonable profits, we also seek to serve the public. In particu­
lar the selfish attitude of profiting oneself at the expense of others . . . should 
be eradicated."37 In 1950, after the Indonesian government's policy of Indone­
sianization had been set in motion, Hsin Pao again commented:
The period of colonial domination of the economy is close to the end.
The history of untold exploitation and squeeze has come to its last 
chapter. From now on, hua-kiao's economy must extricate itself from 
the position of being the tool of the overall colonial economy. . . .
Although the colonial economic power remains firmly rooted . . . 
the Indonesian national economy is growing day by day. Even though 
it is still in the burgeoning stage, it is subjected to various kinds of 
political privilege; in addition, the government does not deny its role 
in fostering the Indonesian national economy. From now on, all forms 
of Indonesian national business and industry may secure the govern­
ment's protection . . . the development of the Indonesian national 
economy from its infant stage to maturity is merely a matter of time. 38
One may then consider the period from the declaration of Indonesia's indepen­
dence to the early 1950s as a transitional period in terms of the changing position 
of the totok Chinese business class. Employment of the term "Chinese middle 
class"39 by the Indonesian nationalist press, and the appearance of the self- 
labeled indigenous "middle class" may not be without significance. It seemed im­
possible for the two "middle classes" to advance at the same time, and the "foreign­
ers" had therefore to take second place. In the early '50s,when the Revolution was 
barely over, the government's economic policy did constitute a very real threat to 
the totok Chinese business class. In this situation, it was natural that many of 
its members should seek protection from China, in order to play safe and to avoid 
the feeling that they were helpless and abandoned.
The Search for Protection
After the transfer of sovereignty, the Chinese community, although still con­
stituting a major part of the business class of Indonesia, faced major obstacles to 
developing either its position or its security. Even if it were able to remain impor­
tant economically, there was no possible way for it to assume a major position in 
Indonesian politics, and, in turn, attempt to secure or consolidate its economic 
position politically. In other words, Chinese businessmen were without political 
power. So long as they were seen as a foreign minority, the Chinese in Indonesia
37. Hsin Pao, July 16, 1949.
38. Ibid., August 4, 1950.
39. See, for example, "The Chinese Middle Class," The Voice of Free Indonesia, 
November 2, 1946.
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could never repeat the experience of the middle class in Western Europe, which 
developed a basis of economic power from which it then proceeded to attain politi­
cal power. Nor were the Indonesian Chinese able to follow the example of their 
counterparts in the Philippines, I*° where the Chinese mestizos did succeed in merg­
ing with the indigenous elite to form an important portion of the middle class as 
well as of the ruling class.1*1 (In that case the contradiction in the position of the 
Chinese was resolved by their ceasing, in effect, to be Chinese.)
Because of the contradiction between their economic and political position, the 
Indonesian Chinese had to remain a politically dependent business class along two 
dimensions, internal and external. First, Chinese businessmen, or the "pariah- 
entrepreneurs," were dependent on local "elite-operators"1*2—political power-hold­
ers who were ethnically not Chinese. Second, the Chinese and Chinese business­
men looked outside Indonesia, to their homeland, for political protection.
To the Chinese business class, the first of these dimensions must be seen as 
essentially one form of "protection." From the outset it is hard to imagine any 
modern business which does not involve interaction with the state bureaucracy. 
Businessmen need the help of bureaucrats to ensure that the smooth-running of 
their businesses not be jeopardized by red tape, or the withdrawal of licenses, 
credits, business access, and so on. Chinese businessmen were no exception to 
this rule. On the other hand, the elite-uperators, well aware of the special vul­
nerability of the Chinese business class, tended to exploit the situation to their 4012
40. For the process of Chinese assimilation in the Philippines, see E. Wickberg,
The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1965), and his "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History," Journal of Southeast 
Asian History, 5 (March 1964), pp. 62-100. The Chinese in Thailand had a similar 
experience: see William Skinner, "Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Over­
seas: A Comparison of Thailand and Java," Nan-yang Hsueh-pao, 16 (1960); see 
also The Siauw Giap, "Religion and Overseas Chinese Assimilation in Southeast 
Asian Countries," Revue du Sudest Asiatique (1965), pp. 67-83.
41. See Wickberg, Chinese in Philippine Life, and R. Constantino, Dissent and 
Counter-consciousness (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), ch. 8.
42. Both the terms "elite-operator" and "pariah-entrepreneur" are used by Fred 
W. Riggs in his Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic 
Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964). See,for example, pp. 116, 188-93.
Joseph Jiang P.L. applied the model to the experience of several Southeast Asian 
countries during the colonial period and shortly after independence. See his 
"Political Change and Pariah Entrepreneurship" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana Uni­
versity, 1962). During the later part of the 1950s, Professor Wertheim used the 
term "pariah group" to describe the Indonesian Chinese business class; see Wer­
theim, Indonesian Society in Transition, p. 163.
"A pariah entrepreneur is a business undertaker (Verleger) belonging to a 
deviant community, more or less identifiable by ethnic origin, religious practices 
or other cultural symbols, and treated with suspicion and low esteen by the domi­
nant community. He is given access to wealth and economic welfare through his 
business enterprise, but lacks legal, political and social power to protect himself 
and his wealth. Hence he can only survive by buying protection from the political 
elite. His social role and function are best illustrated by a sort of symbiosis in 
which he lives precariously with the elite." See Jiang, "Political Change," pp. 
11-12. An "elite-operator may be an official or politician in government, or an in­
fluential person outside the government, closely linked with the elite." Riggs, 
Administration in Developing Countries, p. 190.
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own benefit, both in the colonial period (when the power-holders were mostly 
Dutch officials),1*3 and after independence.
Internal "protection" mainly involved the security and smoothness of day-to- 
day business operations, and it was usually a matter for individuals to arrange in 
relation to particular officials or official cliques. This form of protection, how­
ever, could not guarantee that, in times of serious social turbulence, the property 
and lives of members of the Chinese business class in general would be safe. The 
power of individual "elite-operators" was limited, and they were in no position to 
provide physical protection to their Chinese business clients in critical times. In 
such conditions, entrepreneurs hoped to secure some degree of "protection" from 
their homeland.
It is important to remember that the totok businessmen were a small, economi­
cally better-off, ethnic minority living amid a poverty-stricken majority of another 
race; their role as traders in an underdeveloped society was generally seen as ex­
ploitative; and agitation by leaders of groups within the indigenous society could 
easily arouse strong feelings against them. Their political milieu, then, tended to 
be precarious, and under certain circumstances, such as the chaotic period of 
nationalist struggle or later periods of xenophobia, their security was under di­
rect threat. In such times of extreme difficulty, the last possible resort available 
to them was diplomatic pressure brought to bear from China.
The Indonesian Chinese nationalist and patriotic movement launched during the 
early decades of this century was not fully unconditional: many totok Chinese did 
expect something in return from China. Cheng Kung-po, the Minister of Industry 
of Nationalist China, after visiting the Nanyang including the Indies in 1934, point­
ed out that the patriotism of the overseas Chinese was sincere and vehement, 
but what they truly hoped for was the unity of China. But why the unity? One 
writer, after quoting Cheng, explained: "They [the hua-kiao] hope that China
will unite, so that the government will be able to achieve the responsibility of pro­
tecting Ch'iao Pao [hua-kiao]; this is their greatest hope." From the early decades 
of this century the problem of protection of the hua-kiao was not an uncommon 
theme in the Indies Chinese political arena. In the 1930s, Ang Jan Goan, a staunch 
China-oriented peranakan leader, wrote: "The Chinese here often blame China for 
not being able to advance and protect the interests of her nationals, but why 
should we ask and blame China? Isn't it better to ask ourselves: what have we 
done, as nationals of China, for our nation and country?"1*1* Such a statement re­
flected more than the nationalist belief of Ang Jan Goan; it also clearly illustrated 
the keen expectations of many Indies Chinese, especially totok Chinese.
When during the Revolution the Chinese community in Indonesia were in des­
perate need of protection, their efforts to secure external support were in vain.
It was an historical coincidence that, immediately after they had experienced this 
period of insecurity and had come to realize the indispensability of protection from 
their homeland, China was at last "united." There seems little doubt that this co­
incidence had considerable consequences for the issue of their "political orienta­
tion."
After the transfer of sovereignty and the departure of the old colonial power- 
holders life within Indonesia certainly became more complicated for the Chinese 43
43. See Jiang, "Political Change," ch. 4 on "Pariah Entrepreneurs in Colonial 
Regimes" section B, "The Chinese in the Netherlands Indies," pp. 159-79.
44. Tan HongBoen, Orang-Orang Tionghoa Jang Terkemoeka di Java (Solo: The 
Biographical Publishing Center, 1935), p. 189.
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businessmen. During the chaotic years of revolution, entrepreneur-elite relations 
—this time between Chinese businessmen and asli Indonesians—could not be solid­
ly or widely established, and by the early 1950s, the Chinese business class felt 
threatened and insecure. 45 46789 "Many tung-ch'iao complained that it would be diffi­
cult to do business in the future,” 1*6 and a gloomy atmosphere prevailed in Chinese 
business circles. In July 1949, one commentator said:
In recent years, the Hua [Chinese] businessmen’s historical rights 
have been abolished; importation was restricted, entrepot goods sub­
jected to circumscription . . . numbers of small stalls businesses suf­
fered losses; life was getting harder; there was no room left for im­
porters but taxes remained undiminished. If the Chinese businessmen 
were not vigilant against such crises, probably in the near future the 
so-called importers will decline from the position of erh-p'an-shang 
[middleman] to big warung runners, and small stalls will be on the 
brink of bankruptcy. 97
In face of this pressure, and prompted by lingering nostalgia for his homeland, 
one writer remarked in 1952: "Over the last few years, as a consequence of the 
losses in business, a section of businessmen became politically conscious. They 
have only one hope: the motherland is becoming powerful. Wind up the business 
and return home. It is no longer easy to earn money here, and if the motherland 
is not powerful, it is useless to earn money."1*8 Though it should not be accepted 
at face-value, such a statement does reflect to an important degree the disappoint­
ment of certain businessmen.
In October 1949, at a time when the difficulties posed for the Indonesian Chi­
nese by the Revolution had not yet ended, Communist China came into being, and 
half a year later, Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations were established. It was at 
this juncture that the issue of political loyalty began to present itself directly to 
the overwhelming majority of the totok Chinese. The Nationalist government had 
by then withdrawn to Taiwan, but it continued its claim to be the legitimate gov­
ernment of China. To the many totok Chinese in Indonesia, including the business­
men, it appeared that if, after a few decades of rule in mainland China, the KMT 
should have proved unable even to maintain itself in power there, it could have no 
prospect, from Taiwan, of protecting the overseas Chinese. In addition, of course, 
the Taiwan regime was not recognized by the country in which the totok Chinese 
were residing. Mainly for these reasons, then, many totok businessmen, and, in 
fact, many other Chinese, tended to be China-oriented, or, as the pro-KMT press 
often put it, "pro-communist” or "leftist." Even pro-KMT writers helped to pro­
vide the explanation for businessmen tending to be China-oriented: "In our town,
the majority of those who surrender to the communists are the Hokkiens. The bulk 
of them are fat-cats and magnates; this is because their initial motive is the preser­
vation of their property."1*9
45. The writer does not suggest that there was no "Ali-baba" business in prac­
tice at all during the early '50s. In fact this phenomenon was recognized by totok 
Chinese. See, for example, Fan I, "Lueh-t'an yin-ni hua-ch'iao te chin-hsi" [A 
Brief Account of the Indonesian Chinese: Past and Present], Sheng Huo Pao, 1952 
New Year Special Number.
46. Hsfn Pao, July 16, 1949.
47. Ibid., July 26, 1949.
48. Fang Ts'un, "Hui-ku Solo i-nien" [Review of Solo in the Past Year], Sheng 
Huo Pao, 1952 New Year Special Number.
49. T'ien Sheng Jih Pao, January 1, 1952.
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In May 1950, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Indo­
nesia was celebrated in Jakarta and other towns. According to a pro-KMT source, 
it was because at that time "the hua-kiao did not know the situation in China . . . 
that they felt that life and property needed protection" and they were thus "forced" 
and "pushed" to participate in the celebration. 50 This statement was highly propa­
gandist, but it did point to the crux of the matter.
There is little doubt that the pro-KMT faction was fully aware of the problem 
of protection for the totok Chinese. In October 1952, an Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Conference was held in Taipei, attended by 250 pro-KMT and KMT overseas Chi­
nese from thirty different countries. A four-point proposal formulated by these 
delegates was prepared for submission to the Taiwan government. Not surprising­
ly, the first point proposed was: "To protect the interests of the Chinese abroad, 
especially those residing in the countries which have recognized the communist 
regime."51
In addition to concern for their security and property, other factors also led 
totok businessmen to be China-oriented. In the period after the Second World War, 
a certain number of them still had their savings in China and, because of the pre­
carious political position of the Chinese in Indonesia, they intended eventually to 
return to their country. But the "sweat and blood of half a lifetime melted into 
the air" following the withdrawal of the Nationalist government to Taiwan. 52 Many 
of these totok businessmen, though they had lived in Indonesia for decades, still 
had kinsmen in their birthplaces, and some of them had property there too, in the 
form of land and houses. 53 54 It would not have made sense if, after 1950, they had 
espoused the cause of the KMT government.
Nationality and Security
The protection issue and the threat posed by the Indonesian government’s in­
ternal economic policy also affected the political orientation of the local-born Chi­
nese, as illustrated by the course and result of the issue of citizenship option. 51>
As mentioned earlier, during the Round Table Conference it was decided that 
Indonesian-born Chinese would be given two years—effective from the time the 
agreement was made until December 27, 1951—to decide their nationality. Accord­
ing to this agreement, local-born Chinese could reject Indonesian citizenship if 
they wished to become nationals of China. 55
In making the decision to opt for one or other nationality, concern about their 
legal and economic position in Indonesia appears to have been more important to
50. Chung-Hsing, Yeh-chia-ta hua shang, p . 8.
51. "Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference in Taiwan," Far Eastern Economic Re­
view, January 1, 1953, p . 11.
52. Hsin Pao, November 27, 1950.
53. There were Indonesian Chinese who were "absentee landlords" in their birth­
places. See Sheng Huo Pao, 1952 New Year Special Number.
54. For the Indonesian Chinese citizenship issue, see Willmott, National Status of 
the Chinese, chs. 3 and 8; see also Charles Coppel, "The National Status of the 
Chinese in Indonesia," Papers on Far Eastern History, 1 (March 1970).
55. The issue of nationality option was a complicated one, and in some cases it was 
even confusing; government officials made inconsistent statements concerning this 
issue. See Willmott, National Status of the Chinese, pp. 29-31.
78
the Indonesian Chinese than any other consideration. As we have seen, the Round 
Table agreement on the nationality option was accompanied by a further agreement 
on "protecting the economically weak groups." This statement may have given rise 
to fears in the numerous community of local-born Chinese about their future eco­
nomic treatment even were they to become Indonesian citizens. Events of the 
following years, such as introduction of the Benteng system outlined earlier, in­
creasingly demonstrated that those who opted for Indonesian citizenship were, in 
fact, not granted the same privileges as were enjoyed by asli Indonesians.
Government policy evoked criticism from Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. 
Siauw Giok Tjan, then a member of parliament, was most critical of the "indigenous 
policy." He suggested that racial discrimination was contrary to the national ideal 
of the Republic and argued that it prevented citizens of foreign descent from be­
coming genuine Indonesian patriots as stipulated in the Manifesto of November 1, 
1945. He argued that such discriminatory measures would lead to a system of 
"frontmen, " 56 a system that was, in fact, beginning to develop between asli Indo­
nesians and Chinese businessmen. Djuanda, as Minister of Prosperity, replied to 
these criticisms in July 1950:
The requirement that 70 per cent of the capital must be held by indig­
enous Indonesians is based on the Government’s view that although it 
does not practice racial discrimination, it has the full right to make 
regulations to protect economically weak groups. . . .  As is known, 
indigenous Indonesian nationals as a group are included amongst the 
economically weak. Of course, a few indigenous Indonesians are eco­
nomically strong, but most of them are economically weak. Nationals 
in the country who are not indigenous Indonesians form the economi­
cally strong group. Of course, in that group, there are also economi­
cally weak persons, but these are only exceptions while most are in an 
economically strong position. By providing an opportunity for the 
capital of other than indigenous Indonesians to participate up to 30 
per cent in Indonesian importing companies, the Government feels that 
sufficient opportunity has been given for healthy cooperation between 
citizens. 57
In August 1950, Siauw Giok Tjan in a parliamentary speech spoke of the "in­
digenous policy" in relation to the matter of the citizenship option:
According to international conventions of nationality, each nation has 
the right to formulate its own legislation on nationality and national 
status. As regards the problem of dual nationality, it could be re­
solved by arriving at an agreement with the country concerned. If 
the government intends to set the conditions by which one could be­
come a citizen, a certain regulation may have to be implemented. But 
in no way could the problem be solved by forbidding Indonesian citi­
zens to raise two national flags while at the same time implementing 
the "indigenous policy ."58
Here, Siauw strongly implied that the discriminatory economic policy was the rea­
son for "Indonesian citizens" raising two national flags—that of the Republic of 
Indonesia and that of the People's Republic of China or, less likely, of the Repub-
56. Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 3, p . 1018.
57. Ibid.
58. Hsin Pao, August 14, 1950.
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lie of China. It is easy to believe that this domestic economic factor could well 
have affected the view of local-born Chinese about their future in the country, 
and consequently their political orientation.
Pro-KMT and KMT totoks were no less inclined to comment on the question of 
the national option by referring to the legal status that the local-born Chinese 
would enjoy if they were to become Indonesian citizens. This question became most 
pressing as the end of the period for the citizenship option approached. It was 
pointed out in December 1950 that many local-born Chinese "regret that so far the 
Indonesian government has not promulgated the nationality law. They are there­
fore unclear about whether or not they will be entitled to share the same legal pro­
tection and social welfare as the asli Indonesian." Thus, "with regard to the na­
tionality option, they are in a state of serious hesitation."59 On another occasion, 
a rally held in Jakarta by local-born Chinese was attended by Indonesian officials, 
who attempted to explain the rather confusing issue of the nationality option. A 
member of the rally complained to these officials that, according to the government 
regulation, local-born nationals were not to be discriminated against, but, in prac­
tice, this promise had not been kept. He further enquired whether the government 
had given serious attention to rectifying its discriminatory policy. Other local-born 
Chinese, such as the lawyer Tan Po Goan, raised the question of whether Chinese 
who became Indonesian citizens would be permitted to import benteng goods. The 
Indonesian officials avoided answering these questions. 60
It seems clear, therefore, that doubts about their basic nationality status if 
they became Indonesian citizens were important in leading many local-born Chinese 
to reject Indonesian citizenship. If such was the case for local-born Chinese, it 
was likely to be more so for China-born totok.
Indonesia's external economic relations with China may also have contributed 
to the pro-China leanings of businessmen. In December 1953, during the first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo government, Indonesia's first trade agreement with China was con­
cluded. Although the total value of the trade provided for under this treaty was 
only $2 million (for the year 1954), this was nevertheless a significant step which 
foreshadowed more sizeable future trade between the two countries. In August 
1954, the trade agreement was renewed for 1955, and the value of goods to be ex­
changed leaped to $16.8 million.61 These improving economic relations accompanied 
the strengthening of diplomatic ties between Indonesia and China. To the totok 
businessmen, in terms of their business activity this was a desirable development. 
In this situation, Professor Skinner's explanation of the "leftist" leanings of weal­
thy merchants appears relevant. It is also worth noticing that, as Mozingo com­
mented, Peking won a major victory in the early 1950s when the Bank of China, 
the top Chinese financial institution in Indonesia, broke its ties with Taiwan and 
went over to the CPR. "This caused many wealthy and influential Chinese to fol­
low su it."62
Legal Citizen or "Stateless" Chinese: A Choice
Providing "protection" was one of the most attractive aspects of China's ap­
peals to the overseas Chinese, and "protection" was a term very frequently empha­
59. Ch'ing Pao, December 3, 1951.
60. Ibid.
61. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 389.
62. Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, p. 96.
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sized in the pro-China totok press, particularly during the months following the 
establishment of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations. In the Common Program 
adopted in September 1949, China promised that "The Central Government of the 
People’s Republic of China shall make every effort [chih li] to protect the proper 
rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad."63 64 This promise became the cen­
tral theme of China-oriented newspapers, particularly after China's first ambassa­
dor, Wang Jen-shu, arrived in Indonesia in August 1950. On August 15, 141 
China-oriented Chinese community organizations of Jakarta and 37 from the outer 
islands together held a large celebration to mark the arrival of the ambassador.61* 
In his speech on the occasion, Wang reaffirmed the promise to the totok Chinese 
and added that the new government would "protect the proper rights and interests 
of the hua-kiao seriously."65 It is not necessary here to question whether Wang's 
statement was in a sense an attempt to qualify the original statement made in the 
Common Program. The term "protection" by itself was vague. To the Indonesian 
Chinese of Chinese nationality, such a general promise may have been more than 
satisfactory; but, on one occasion, Hsin Pao did mention the economic interests of 
the totok Chinese in the context of China's "protection." When the Indonesian 
government was still considering the question of setting up Chinese consulates in 
Indonesia, the pro-China totok press commented: "The purpose of setting up con­
sulates is to foster commercial and industrial interests, and to protect the Chinese 
abroad."66 In any case, to totok businessmen in Indonesia and, more generally, 
to many of the Chinese community who had not opted for Indonesian citizenship 
and who had longed for decades for some protection from their homeland, the gen­
eral promise was attractive enough.
China's policy toward the overseas Chinese did not, however, remain un­
changed during the few years under review. In fact as early as mid-November 
1950 there was an indication of a shift in attitude when the Chinese embassy made 
clear that for overseas Chinese to acquire Indonesian citizenship, they "would be 
required to obtain 'letters of explanation' from the Chinese government."67 As
63. "Kung-t'ung kang-ling" [The Common Program], Article 58, Chung-hua jen- 
min kung-ho-kuo k'ai-kuo wen-hsien [Documents on the Founding of the People's 
Republic of China], cited in Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese:
A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), p. 81.
64. Hsin Pao, August 16, 1950. August 17 is the national day of the Republic of 
Indonesia. The reason why this particular day was chosen to celebrate Wang's 
arrival may be partly due to the fact that the Chinese embassy intended to empha­
size the national friendship between China and Indonesia. On that day, Wang was 
mentioned in the pro-China press as a staunch supporter of the Indonesian Revo­
lution. But there may have been one more reason that prompted the pro-China 
faction to choose that day to celebrate Wang's arrival. As many totok Chinese, 
whether Taiwan-oriented or China-oriented, celebrated the national day of Indo­
nesia and raised the national flag of Indonesia, that of the CPR or RC was at the 
same time raised by the respective factions. The celebration on that day could 
serve as pressure on totok Chinese to show their loyalty to China. The situation 
was certainly unfavorable to Taiwan-oriented totoks.
65. Hsin Pao, August 16, 1950.
66. "O-kuo she-ling wen-t'i" [The Problem of Setting up Chinese Consulates], 
ib id., Editorial, November 14, 1950.
67. Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, p. 93.
81
Dr. Mozingo has pointed out, this implied that "Peking was prepared,in principle, 
to renounce claims on some overseas Chinese. . . . " 68 9
Significantly, almost at the same time as the Chinese embassy issued this 
declaration, an editorial of Hsin Pao, entitled "Which Way Would You Choose," 
seemed to echo the statement:
The period of dual nationality is over. This is the time for hua-kiao 
. . .  to make a choice of their nationality. Hua-kiao—especially those 
not locally born—have their next of kin, relatives and friends in the 
motherland; in particular they are consanguineous to the Chinese peo­
ple [chung-hua min-tsu]. The magnificent landscape of the mother­
land, its culture and customs, all these remain in the mind and are 
unforgettable. But on the other hand, hua-kiao—especially those who 
are local-born—have been living in this country for generations . . . 
the fruits of their labor, the ground on which they earn their living 
are all located here. They would . . . find it hard to establish a 
foothold if they were to return to the motherland.69
This editorial had most likely received embassy approval before it was published.
Its tone does not seem designed to encourage local-born Chinese to become Chinese 
citizens, but possibly reflects the Peking government's increasing awareness by 
late 1950 of its inability to provide actual "protection" for its overseas citizens, 
and the resulting necessity of adjusting China's policy towards them. These policy 
adjustments by the Chinese embassy in late’ 1950 should possibly be seen as a pre­
lude to Peking's modified Overseas Chinese policy proclaimed later.
In January 1951, only fifteen months after China had promised to "make every 
effort" to protect the overseas Chinese, Ho Hsiang-ning, the Chairwoman of the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, announced that the situation of the overseas 
Chinese "is certain to become increasingly difficult," and that overseas Chinese 
should depend for their survival "on the strength of their own efforts." As Dr. 
Fitzgerald pointed out: "Although protection of Overseas Chinese was still pro­
claimed as a basic principle of Overseas Chinese policy . . . from the beginning of 
1951, self-reliance became the keynote of the policy for protection." 70 There was 
clear evidence that this policy of "self-reliance" was also applied to the Indonesian 
Chinese. After late 1950, the pro-China totok press began to play down the prom­
ise of "protection," replacing it by reference to the hua-kiao's "self-reliance." The 
decision of most, if  not all, the local-born Chinese to opt for Chinese nationality, 
then, was not made at a time that Peking appeared most willing to "protect" them, 
but at a time that Peking's promise had receded into the background. In other 
words, it was largely during the months when Peking was urging the overseas 
Chinese to be self-reliant that most of the local-born Chinese made their decision 
to reject Indonesian citizenship.
By late 1951, which was close to the end of the two-year period of the citizen­
ship option, the Indonesian Justice Department estimated that more than 390,000 
Indonesian-born Chinese had rejected Indonesian nationality.71 By 1953, the num­
ber had increased to about 600-700,000. As Dr. Mozingo has put it: "Jakarta
68. Ib id ., p. 94.
69. Hsin Pao, November 17, 1950.
70. Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, pp. 81-82.
71. Skinner, "Chinese Minority," p. 111.
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greatly under-estimated the number of loeal-born Chinese who actually would go 
to the trouble to opt for Peking citizenship despite the fact that most Chinese had 
a petty-capitalist background and could have easily acquired Indonesian citizen­
ship by simply remaining silent." 72
Although the overwhelming majority of the local-born Chinese opted for citizen­
ship either of Indonesia or of the CPR, it should not be forgotten that the KMT 
faction was also involved in the issue. After the Nationalist government had re­
treated to Taiwan, the overseas Chinese were still regarded by that government 
as nationals of "China” (Republic of China). Indonesia recognized only the CPR 
and, in principle, if local-born Chinese were to reject Indonesian citizenship, and 
if they wanted to become "legal citizens" recognized by the Indonesian government, 
they had to opt for CPR nationality. In the face of this situation, the KMT totok 
Chinese faction could not remain silent. If it did, this would mean, in the eyes of 
all Chinese, including the pro-KMT Chinese in Indonesia, that it implicitly accepted 
the fact that there was one China—the People's Republic. This would further sig­
nify that the political leverage of the KMT faction would be seriously weakened in 
the eyes of all Indonesian Chinese. The most urgent task of that faction, then, 
was to try to prove to all the Chinese, and particularly to the local-born Chinese, 
that to be citizens of the Republic of China was not to be "stateless." The KMT 
faction did attempt this crucial task73—but was apparently unsuccessful in per­
suading local-born Chinese to become "citizens" of the Republic o f China. Mean­
while, the pro-China totok did not lose the opportunity of emphasizing the differ­
ences between "stateless" Chinese and "Chinese citizens." It was often pointed 
out that only the "white Chinese," that is, Chinese with some Dutch blood, would 
want to be "stateless," and in Indonesia they would receive no diplomatic protec­
tion from the CPR. In addition, pro-KMT totoks would face other difficulties,such 
as obtaining a passport for overseas travel. 74
It appears that, after Indonesia recognized China, a totok Chinese had no 
documentary proof that he was either a CPR national or was "stateless." This fact 
had consequences which seem to have been misinterpreted by some observers. In 
a situation where the identity of a totok Chinese could not be established, the most 
simple and common way for him to demonstrate his nationality was through the use 
of the national flag: totok Chinese who considered themselves nationals of China 
raised the "five-stars flag" at their homes during China's national day or on other 
occasions. 75 Outwardly, this phenomenon could easily give the impression that 
these totoks were politically active, or ideologically pro-Peking, or even procommu­
nist, and a seemingly logical inference was that totok society overall was highly 
political. In fact, this may not have been the case for the majority of the totok 
Chinese. Particularly among the totok business class, such considerations as the 
hope for protection, the need to have business deals with China and carry out 
business trips overseas, naturally led them to "opt" for China citizenship; and if 
they did so, they had to prove their identity by outward political symbols. Besides
72. Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, p. 97.
73. For a discussion of attempts by KMT forces in Taiwan and Indonesia to retain 
the allegiance of Indonesian Chinese, see Twang, "Internal Dynamics," ch. 6.
74. Ch'%ng Pao, December 16, 1950; July 12, 1951.
75. Raising the five-stars flag was certainly a symbol showing oneself to be a citi­
zen of China. The pro-China press encouraged the totok Chinese to "unite under 
the five-stars flag": see "T'uan-chieh tsai wu-hsing-ch'i-hsia" [Unite under the 
Five-stars Flag], ibid., Editorial, August 15, 1950.
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raising the "five-stars flag," if conditions allowed, such pro-China political ges­
tures as verbal praise of the new China's development seemed to be required.
This is certainly not to say that the political behavior of the totok Chinese busi­
nessmen was merely for effect; the genuine quality of their sentiment toward their 
homeland in the early '50s is hard to deny.
*  *  *
In this article, I have attempted to explain the China orientation of the totok 
business class in Indonesia in the early 1950s. Attention has been drawn to a 
number of, mainly internal, political and economic issues which combined to account 
for their political behavior. There was a built-in contradiction in the position of 
the Chinese businessmen in Indonesia during the period under review: being an 
ethnic minority as well as a business class, they were necessarily politically depen­
dent and were, therefore, compelled to seek both internal and external political 
protection in order to sustain their economic position in the Indonesian context. 
Internal political protection could only ensure the day-to-day operation o f their 
business. External political protection became important in times of great social 
turbulence when not only the Chinese businessmen, but the ethnic Chinese as a 
whole,became the target of attack. This was most clearly evident during the years 
of revolution. When their basic survival was threatened,many Chinese were in­
clined to support whatever regime was willing to offer protection, as had been viv­
idly demonstrated during the Japanese occupation. During the few years preceding 
the transfer of sovereignty, the vulnerability of the Indonesian Chinese even led 
them to beg protection from the collapsing Nationalist government.
The inability of the Nationalist government during the late 1940s to provide any 
external protection for the Chinese in Indonesia was matched, after independence, 
by a dwindling of the internal economic protection they could expect from local pa­
trons. This was a consequence of the Indonesian government's unfavorable domes­
tic economic policy towards the Chinese in general, and particularly towards the 
totok business class, which they felt as a serious threat to their economic posi­
tion. It was a historical coincidence that, immediately before 1950, political events 
in both Indonesia and China caused a situation in which the Chinese business com­
munity lacked both internal and external protection, and this combined with their 
deteriorating economic condition to increase the attraction of Peking. In fact, had 
Peking not itself claimed to be the protector of the Chinese, many totok Chinese 
would probably have taken the initiative in demanding its protection or seeking 
protection elsewhere. It is ironic that, at just the time that many of them were 
opting for CPR citizenship, Peking itself realized its inability to provide protec­
tion and tried to encourage them to accept Indonesian citizenship.
The Hatta government's recognition o f the People’s Republic of China compelled 
almost all totok Chinese to take sides in the conflict between Taiwan and China, as 
from then on the only "legal Chinese citizens" in Indonesia were those owing alle- 
gience to Peking. After the disturbed years in Indonesia and with the rise of the 
new China, many totok Chinese, certainly including the businessmen, wished to 
end their bitter experience of being "overseas orphans." Basically, then, it was 
their concern for security that caused them to be China-oriented.
